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We conduct an empirical study of the impact of consumer price-search on the shifting of cigarette
excise taxes to consumer prices.   We use novel data on the prices smokers report actually paying for
cigarettes.  We document substantial price dispersion.  We find that cigarette  taxes are shifted at lower
rates to the prices paid by consumers who undertake more price search – carton buyers, and especially,
smokers who buy cartons of cigarettes in a state other than their state of residence.  We also find suggestive
evidence that taxes are shifted at slightly higher rates to the prices paid by non-daily smokers, less
addicted smokers, and smokers of light cigarettes.
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1.  Introduction 
  Economists emphasize that the behavior of buyers and sellers in market, not 
statutes, determines who really pays a tax (Fullerton and Metcalf 2002).  For excise 
and sales taxes, one of the most basic questions is whether taxes are shifted forwards 
to consumers, or backwards to suppliers and factors of production.  A general 
principle is that taxes tend to be shifted away from the economic agents most able to 
change their behavior in response to the tax.  For example, in a competitive industry 
with free entry and exit and perfectly elastic supply, in equilibrium the tax is shifted 
away from suppliers, towards consumers.  Empirical studies of the most common 
excise taxes in the U.S. – taxes on alcohol, cigarettes, and gasoline – usually conclude 
that they are fully shifted to consumers.  In fact, most studies of alcohol and cigarette 
taxes find that they are over-shifted, i.e passed through to consumer prices at a rate 
higher than one-for-one.
1   Empirical studies also conclude that general sales taxes are 
fully shifted to consumer prices, with evidence of over-shifting in some markets.
2   
                                                           
 
1Cook (1981), Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002), and Kenkel (2005) find 
evidence that alcohol excise taxes are over-shifted.  Similarly, Barzel (1976), Johnson 
(1978), Sumner and Ward (1981), Keeler et al. (1996), Delipalla and O’Donnell 
(2001) and Hanson and Sullivan (2009) find evidence that cigarette excise taxes are 
over-shifted.  In contrast to previous research, Harding, Leibtag, and Lovenheim 
(2010) use unique transaction-level data and find under-shifting for both alcohol and 
cigarette taxes. Alm, Senoga, and Skidmore (2009) find evidence that in urban states 
gasoline taxes are fully passed through to prices, but their estimates suggest that in 
rural states gasoline taxes are under-shifted.       
 
2 Poterba (1996) finds that sales taxes are shifted to retail prices of clothing 
and personal care items at a rate of about one-for-one.  Besley and Rosen (1999) find 
evidence of tax over-shifting in about half of the 12 goods markets they study.    
  2
The observed over-shifting in many goods markets is consistent with theoretical 
analyses of tax shifting under oligopoly and imperfect competition.
3 
  The standard approach in empirical studies of the shifting of excise and sales 
taxes is to compare prices across markets with different tax rates, observing a single 
price (e.g. the average price) in each market.
4 However, there can be substantial 
within-market dispersion in the prices paid by consumers.  In a review of research on 
the extent of price dispersion in various markets, including on-line markets, Baye, 
Morgan, and Scholten (2006, pp.44-45) conclude that:  “price dispersion is ubiquitous 
and persistent....[and] is still the rule rather than the exception....”  Search-theoretic 
models help explain why price differences are not completely arbitraged away.  Like 
equilibrium tax shifting, the behavior of buyers and sellers in markets, including 
buyers’ search behavior, determines equilibrium price dispersion.  
   In this paper we conduct an empirical study of the impact of price-search 
behaviors on the shifting of cigarette excise taxes to consumer prices.   Theoretical 
models and empirical research suggest that consumer price search is especially 
common for frequently purchased items like cigarettes.  In addition to the price search 
common in many markets, cigarette consumers can shop for volume discounts by 
buying cartons instead of packs, and they can even cross state borders to avoid excise 
                                                           
 
3In market conditions other than perfect competition, theory predicts a number 
of possible outcomes, including both over- or under-shifting of taxes to consumer 
prices (Katz and Rosen 1985, Stern 1987, Besley 1989).  
 
4Of the 13 studies cited in footnotes 1 and 2, 10 use data with a single price 
per market.  Kenkel (2005) and Hanson and Sullivan (2009) use data with multiple 
prices, collected from surveys of retailers.  Harding, Leibtag, and Lovenheim (2010) 
use transaction-level prices from scanner data.  
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taxes (Lovenheim 2008, DeCicca, Kenkel and Liu 2010).  If more price-sensitive 
consumers engage in more search, the general principle of tax shifting implies that 
cigarette excise taxes will be shifted at a lower rate to the prices paid by consumers 
who engage in more search.  However, to the best of our knowledge, previous public 
finance and health economics research has not explored the impact of price-search 
behavior on tax shifting, either in general or for the cigarette market in particular.     
  We use novel data from the 2003 and 2006-07 cycles of the Tobacco Use 
Supplements to the Consumer Population Survey (TUS-CPS).   The TUS-CPS 
contains data on the prices paid for cigarettes by a national pooled sample of about 
60,000 smokers.   As described in more detail in section 2, our first contribution is 
simply to document that cigarette prices show substantial dispersion that is not 
entirely due to differences in state- or local-taxes.  The TUS-CPS also contains data 
on some behaviors consumers adopt to lower the prices they pay for cigarettes, 
including buying by the carton instead of the pack and buying cigarettes across state 
borders.  Consumers who adopt these behaviors report paying substantially lower 
prices for cigarettes.   
  In section 3 we use the TUS-CPS data to examine the degree to which state 
cigarette excise taxes are shifted to consumers who engage in different search 
behaviors.  Consistent with previous estimates, for the full sample we find evidence 
that taxes are fully shifted to consumer prices.   However, the average rate of shifting 
masks substantial differences by search behavior.  We estimate that the rate at which  
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taxes are shifted to consumer prices is only 0.79 for the prices paid by home-state 
carton buyers, and only 0.26 for the prices paid by away-state carton buyers.    
  In section 4, we take a different cut at the data and explore whether tax 
shifting is related to smoking behavior. We find that taxes are shifted to consumer 
prices at about the same rates across most groups of smokers, but there is some 
evidence of slight over-shifting to non-daily and less-addicted smokers and smokers 
of light cigarettes.  Combined with the results of the Section 3 model, the empirical 
evidence suggests that for tax shifting, search behavior appears to be more important 
than smoking behavior.     
  Section 5 concludes and discusses directions for future work. 
2.  Cigarette Price Dispersion 
  The 2003 and 2006-2007 cycles of the TUS-CPS provide novel data on the 
prices consumers report actually paying for the cigarettes they purchased, and on 
some price-search behaviors.  The Tobacco Use Supplements (TUS) have been 
sponsored by the National Cancer Institute and administered as part of the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), the U.S. Census Bureau's continuing labor force survey 
(Hartman et al. 2002, US Department of Commerce, Census Bureau 2006).  Questions 
about cigarette prices were included in the 2003 cycle (conducted in February, June, 
and November 2003) and the 2006 - 2007 cycle (conducted in May and August 2006 
and January 2007).  Smokers were asked to report how much they paid for their last 
pack or carton of cigarettes, after using discounts or coupons.  Smokers were also 
asked whether they usually buy their cigarettes by the pack or by the carton, whether  
  5
their last purchase was in their state of residence or some other state, and whether they 
bought cigarettes over the internet or by other means.  We use these responses to 
create four mutually exclusive categories of smokers: pack buyers; home-state carton 
buyers; away-state carton buyers; and buyers over the internet or other means.
5  Our 
analysis samples consist of about 32,000 smokers from the 2003 TUS-CPS and about 
28,000 from the 2006-2007 TUS-CPS.  
  Table 1 describes the TUS-CPS data on cigarette prices.  Cigarette prices are 
standardized as price per pack.
6  In addition to average prices paid, Table 1 also 
reports the coefficient of variation (the mean divided by the standard deviation), 
which is a common measure of price dispersion (Baye, Morgan and Scholten 2006).  
For the full sample of reported prices paid, the coefficient of variation is about 33 
percent in 2003 and 36 percent in 2006 - 2007.  This degree of price dispersion is 
roughly comparable to that seen for other goods (Baye, Morgan and Scholten 2006, 
Table 1a).  For example, Lach (2002) find coefficients of variation from 11 to 20 
percent for coffee prices in Israel, and Scholten and Smith (2002) find coefficients of 
                                                           
 
5About five percent of smokers report that they usually buy both packs and 
cartons; we categorize them as pack buyers.  We pool home-state and away-state pack 
buyers together, because of relatively small samples of away-state pack buyers (about 
450 smokers in each TUS cycle).  About 2.5 percent of smokers, mainly non-daily 
smokers, report that they usually do not buy their own cigarettes, so they do not report 
prices and are not included in our analysis.   
 
6We also imposed consistent top-coding across the 2003 and 2006-2007 TUS-
CPS data.  In the 2003 survey coding, the highest possible prices were $9.99 per pack 
and $99.99 per carton.  In the 2006 - 2007 survey coding, the highest possible prices 
were $99.99 per pack and $999.99 per carton.  Imposing the 2003 top codes involved 
less than one percent of the 2006 - 2007 sample (226 observations) and did not change 
most empirical results.  However, if we do not impose the 2003 top codes, the 
calculated coefficient of variation is much higher in 2006 - 2007.     
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variation from 2 to 42 percent for the prices of consumer sundries in Bloomington, 
Indiana retail markets.   
  Looking across price-shopping behaviors, in round numbers about 65 percent 
of smokers report buying packs, about 30 percent report buying cartons of cigarettes 
in their home state, another 3 percent report buying cartons of cigarettes in another 
state, and less than one percent report buying cigarettes over the internet or by other 
means.  Compared to consumers who buy cigarettes by the pack, consumers who buy 
cartons in their home state report paying about $1.00 less per pack, or about 25 
percent less.  Consumers who travel across state borders to purchase their cartons of 
cigarettes report paying even lower prices.  The small number of consumers who 
report that they buy their cigarettes over the internet or by other means report the 
lowest prices paid.
7   Measured price dispersion is not too different across pack 
buyers, home-state carton buyers, and non-home state carton buyers.  There is greater 
dispersion in the prices paid by consumers who report buying their cigarettes over the 
internet or by other means.  This is not surprising, because by definition this category 
appears inherently more heterogeneous.   
                                                           
 
7The low prevalence of internet purchases might seem surprising, and could 
reflect TUS-CPS respondents’ reluctance to report actions of questionable legality.  
As Goolsbee, Lovenheim, and Slemrod (2007) point out, there is very little systematic 
evidence about the volume of internet cigarette sales.   Goolsbee, Lovenheim and 
Slemrod estimate a model of state taxable cigarette sales that includes a measure of 
internet penetration in the state.  Their model implies that, compared to a counter-
factual with no internet sales, in 2000 internet sales reduced home-state cigarette sales 
by 3.3 percent.   
  7
  Part of the observed price dispersion in the TUS-CPS data reflects variation in 
state excise taxes on cigarettes.  In a simple descriptive regression (not reported but 
available upon request), variation in state excise taxes explains 33 percent of the 
variation in prices paid (i.e. the R
2 = 0.33).  Of the remaining variation, an additional 
11 percent is explained by adding to the descriptive regression indicator variables for 
home-state and away-state carton buyers.  The improvement in the R
2 to 0.44 is 
substantial in the context of a large microdata set. 
Because the TUS-CPS is representative by state, we can also examine the 
average price and coefficient of variation by state (Appendix Table).  The coefficients 
of variation for cigarette price paid across states are in a fairly narrow range from 
around 20 to 40 percent.  The price dispersion within  most states is only slightly less 
than the price dispersion in the entire sample, again suggesting that excise tax 
differences do not drive all of the measured price dispersion.
8    
We can also compare the TUS-CPS state-average prices to the average price 
by state reported in the Tax Burden on Tobacco [TBOT] (Orzechowski and Walker 
2008).  TBOT is the standard source of cigarette price data used in virtually every 
study of U.S. cigarette demand.   The two state-average price series are highly 
correlated ( r = 0.94), but the TBOT state-average prices are systematically higher.
9     
                                                           
 
8In some states, localities impose additional excise taxes. Some of the within-
Illinois price dispersion is due to sizeable taxes imposed by Chicago and Cook 
County.  Some of the within-New York price dispersion is due to the sizeable tax in 
New York City.  A number of other cities and counties, mainly in Alabama, Missouri, 
and Virginia, also impose local taxes, but these are very small.     
 
9The methodology of the TBOT price series is not reported, so we can only 
speculate why the prices are systematically higher.  Possible reasons the TBOT prices  
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  We only observe some of the sources of the observed dispersion in the TUS-
CPS cigarette price data.   While the TUS-CPS instructed consumers to report the 
price paid after using discounts or coupons, it did not collect information on who used 
discounts and coupons.  The TUS-CPS also did not collect information on brand 
preferences.  The cigarette market includes standard-priced brands such as Marlboro 
and Camel and discount and deep discount brands (Bulow and Klemperer 1998).  
From several sources, we estimate that discounted sales and sales of discount brands 
account for about 30 percent of total sales.  The price differences due to discounts and 
brand choice are about $1.00 per pack, the same size difference as we report in Table 
2 for pack- versus- carton buyers.  A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that 
these unobserved factors alone would lead to a coefficient of variation in prices of 
about 12 percent, substantially below the 33 - 36 percent we observe in the TUS-CPS 
price data.
10  Finally, we note that consumers may pay different prices for the exact 
                                                                                                                                                                      
might be higher include: they do not include the volume discounts for carton 
purchases; they do not reflect other price discounts and coupons; or they come from 
an unrepresentative sample of retailers.  Even after we restrict the TUS - CPS sample 
to include only pack prices, the TBOT prices are still about $0.30 per pack higher than 
the TUS-CPS state average prices.  As discussed below and in footnote 10, price 
discounts and coupons are probably not common enough and large enough to explain 
the differences between the state-average prices.  Future work could explore the 
implications of measurement error in the TBOT price series for previous estimates of 
the price-elasticity of cigarette demand.     
 
10 In supermarket scanner data from 49 geographic markets from 1997 - 2005, 
Lillard and Sfekas (2010) report that discounted sales make up just under two percent 
of total sales, with the average discount offer being worth about $1.00 per pack.   The 
price difference between standard and discount brands also appears to be about $1.00 
per pack (authors’ calculations from Euromonitor 2003).  For the back-of-the-
envelope calculation, based on Euromonitor’s (2003) market report we assume that 72 
percent of smokers buy standard brands at an average price of about $4.00 per pack 
and 28 percent buy discount brands at an average price of about $3.00 per pack.   
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same brand, and there may be idiosyncratic differences in self-reports of the price 
paid for cigarettes.  Although we can not observe these other sources, the results in 
Table 2 demonstrate important price differences associated with the search behaviors 
we observe.  
3.  Tax Shifting and Price-Shopping Behaviors 
  To describe tax shifting, we follow Poterba (1996) and Belsey and Rosen 
(1999) and estimate reduced-form equations that show the price paid by consumer i in 
state s as a function of the tax rate T and a vector X of demand- and supply-shifters, to 
which we add a vector S of search-cost shifters:   
(1)   Pis = β0 + β1 Ts + β2 Xis + β3 Sis + εis 
The main focus of our analysis is on our estimates of β1.   In our linear specification, 
full shifting of taxes to consumer prices implies β1 = 1.   
Table 2 contains the definitions and means of the explanatory variables, and 
the sources for the state-level variables.  The tax T is measured as the tax rate in the 
state of purchase.  The vector X includes individual characteristics such as age, 
schooling, and income, indicators for size of the metropolitan area, region of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Based on Lillard and Sfekas (2010), we assume that two percent of all purchases 
involve a discount of about $1.00 per pack, and that only standard brand purchases are 
discounted.  Assuming that 70 percent of the sample pays $4.00 per pack and 30 
percent of the sample pays $3.00 per pack yields a coefficient of variation of 0.12.  Of 
course, there is additional dispersion from several sources.  Interestingly, the market 
report claims that: “Standard cigarettes in the US display little or no price variation 
between brands....Price variation is instead determined by what state the consumer 
lives in, and what channel is being used for the purchase. Therefore, a pack of 
Marlboros is likely to be the same price as a pack of Camels within the same store” 
(Euromonitor 2003, p. 3).       
  10
residence, and survey year.
 11 The vector S includes state-level variables that may shift 
price search-costs: an indicator for whether the state has a minimum price law for 
cigarettes; and the per capita density of retail outlets that sell cigarettes.   However, 
our reduced-form approach does not allow us to give purely structural interpretation 
to the elements of the estimated vectors  β2  and  β3.    
  To describe the extent to which excise taxes are shifted to consumer cigarette 
prices on average, we first estimate equation (1) for the full sample, where we have 
pooled together the 2003 and 2006 - 2007 data.   To describe the impact of price 
search on tax shifting, we next estimate equation (1) over different sub-samples:  pack 
buyers; home-state carton buyers; and away-state carton buyers.
12   Like standard 
empirical tax incidence studies, our approach is, in a sense, descriptive.  We take 
observed search behaviors as given (exogenous), and describe the rates at which taxes 
are shifted to the prices paid in equilibrium by different groups of consumers. 
  Table 3 contains estimates of equation (1) for the full sample and different 
sub-samples.  Our point estimate of 1.02 implies that on average, state cigarette excise 
taxes are very slightly over-shifted to consumer prices; we can not reject the 
hypothesis that the rate of shifting is 1.  We find that cigarette taxes are under-shifted 
                                                           
 
11In additional specifications (not reported but available upon request) we add 
state fixed effects to X, or alternatively a measure of state anti-smoking sentiment 
(DeCicca et al. 2008).  The patterns of results are similar to those reported in Table 3, 
with somewhat lower estimated pass-through rates.  
 
12Table 2 includes another group who report buying their cigarettes over the 
internet or by other means.  We do not estimate equation (1) for this sub-sample 
because even pooling together the 2003 and 2006 - 2007 data provides a sample of 
less than 300 observations.    
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to the prices paid by consumers who engage in more price search.  For consumers 
who buy cartons in their home state, taxes are shifted to prices at an estimate rate of 
0.79.  For consumers who buy cartons in a state other than their state of residence, the 
estimated rate of shifting rate is 0.26.  Because we measure tax in the purchase tax, 
this result means that not only do these consumers avoid their higher home-state 
cigarette tax, but that the lower away-state tax is not fully shifted to the price they 
paid.  For both groups of carton buyers, we can reject the hypothesis that the rates of 
shifting equal 1.0.  These patterns are consistent with the general principle of tax 
shifting, that taxes are shifted away from economic agents who are most able to 
change their behavior. 
  We do not find evidence that the search-cost shifters – state minimum price 
laws and cigarette retail outlet density – are statistically significantly related to the 
prices consumers report paying.  In addition to their possible effect on the conditional 
mean prices in the regression, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the search cost-
shifters might also increase price dispersion (variance).  In other words, 
heteroskedasticity is a prediction, not just a potential problem.  We report 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors (from Stata’s robust command), so it is not 
a problem for the results reported in Table 3.  When we test for heteroskedasticity, our 
results support the prediction that higher cigarette retail outlet density reduces 
cigarette price dispersion.
13    
                                                           
 
13Although the relationship between the number of sellers and price dispersion 
is “model specific” in theory, Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2006, p. 40) review several 
empirical studies that find that more competition reduces dispersion.  
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  Although they can not be given structural interpretations, the estimated effects 
of the other explanatory variables in equation (1) are also interesting.   Compared to 
white smokers, Black and Hispanic smokers on average pay about $0.30 more (almost 
ten percent more) per pack.  Residents of the largest cities (with populations over 2.5 
million) pay an additional $0.34 more per pack.  The price paid also tends to decrease 
with age and increases with schooling and income.   The patterns for age, schooling, 
and income might mainly reflect brand preferences rather than differences in price 
search; for example, younger smokers are more likely to smoke the higher-priced 
premium brands (Cummings et al. 1997).   Perhaps reflecting economies of scale in 
price search, smokers who live in households with other smokers report paying lower 
prices.    
4.  Tax Shifting and Smoking Behavior 
  Instead of categorizing smokers by their search behavior, in this section we 
take several different cuts at the data, based on smoking behaviors.  The price-
elasticity of demand might tend to vary with smoking behavior.  At the same time, the 
benefits and costs of consumer price search might also tend to vary with smoking 
behavior.  As in section 3, our approach is to describe the rates at which taxes are 
shifted to the prices paid in equilibrium by different groups of consumers, now 
defined by their smoking behaviors. 
Table 4 reports the estimated pass-through rates (i.e., the estimated coefficient 
β1 on the tax variable) from our re-estimates of equation (1) for the new sub-samples 
defined by smoking behaviors.  Complete results are available upon request.  In the  
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first panel of Table 4, smokers are categorized as: non-daily smokers; daily light 
smokers; daily moderate smokers; and daily heavy smokers.  In the second panel, we 
categorize smokers based on whether they report attempting to quit smoking within 
the past year, and whether they report seriously planning to quit smoking within the 
next six months. In the third panel of Table 4, we take a slightly different cut and 
categorize smokers by a proxy for their degree of addiction.  To measure the degree of 
addiction to smoking, the TUS-CPS and other health surveys ask smokers: “How 
soon after you wake up do you typically smoke your first cigarette of the day?” In the 
fourth and fifth panels of Table 4, we categorize smokers by their choices of light 
cigarettes versus regular cigarettes, and menthol versus non-menthol cigarettes.   
  The point estimates tend to suggest that taxes are somewhat over-shifted to 
non-daily smokers, less addicted smokers, and smokers of light cigarettes: the 
estimated rates of pass-through to prices paid are 1.12, 1.11, and 1.13 respectively.  
Similarly, there appears to be a slight gradient with quitting behavior and intents:  
taxes are passed through at a slightly higher rate (1.04) to smokers who report quit 
attempts and intents.  However, none of these estimates in Table 4 is statistically 
significantly different than 1.  For the other groups of smokers, the estimated pass-
through rates are always about 1.  The suggestive pattern is a little surprising, because 
it might be expected that heavier and more addicted smokers are less able to adjust 
their behavior in response to taxes.  However, this might be offset by more price 
search, so that in equilibrium we observe some tendency for cigarette taxes to be 
shifted more towards lighter smokers.  
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5.  Conclusion 
  Using novel data on reported prices paid for cigarettes, we find that cigarette 
excise taxes are shifted at lower rates to the prices paid by consumers who undertake 
more price search behavior – carton buyers, and especially, smokers who buy cartons 
of cigarettes in a state other than their state of residence.  Although generally search 
behavior seems to matter more than smoking behavior for tax shifting, we also find 
suggestive evidence that taxes are shifted at slightly higher rates to the prices paid by 
non-daily smokers, less addicted smokers, and smokers of light cigarettes.  Echoing 
the basic economic insight that taxes do not necessarily stay where legislatures place 
them, our results sound some cautions for cigarette tax policy.  In equilibrium, 
cigarette excise taxes may be differentially shifted towards groups of consumers 
whose smoking is of less concern for policy (e.g. non-daily and less addicted 
smokers).   
  Future work could take several directions, depending upon data availability.  
Our descriptive analysis of tax shifting in equilibrium could be extended by 
embedding the analysis in a structural model of the jointly endogenous choices of 
price search and smoking on the demand side, as well as modeling the supply side of 
the retail cigarette market.  A structural approach would provide predictions about 
consumer behavior under new tax policies and environments and allow a more 
complete policy analysis (Heckman and Vytlacil 2005).  For example, because we 
estimate that cigarette taxes are under-shifted to the prices paid by cigarette carton-
buyers, some policy advocates might be tempted to consider a special tax on cartons.    
  15
However, the endogenous sorting of pack- versus carton-buying means that it might 
not be possible to exploit the observed equilibrium relationship between price search 
and tax shifting.  The same market forces could keep the new tax from being fully 
shifted too.  Although structural estimation addresses this limitation in principle, in 
practice identification would be challenging.  In particular, it would be difficult to find 
suitable instrumental variables to separately identify search behaviors and smoking 
behavior and to identify behavior on the supply-side of the market. 
  Another direction for future work is to explore the implications of price search 
for the incidence of cigarette taxes across income groups.  Standard analyses conclude 
that because smokers have lower incomes in the U.S., cigarette taxes are regressive 
(Lyon and Schwab 1995, Colman and Remler 2008).  These standard analyses are 
incomplete if taxes are differentially passed through to the prices paid by consumers 
with different incomes.  Indeed, Heiding, Leibtag and Lovenheim (2010) find that 
cigarette taxes are fully shifted to the prices middle-income consumers pay, but less 
than fully shifted to the prices paid by both low- and high-income consumers.  Future 
work could further explore the role of consumer price search in these patterns of tax 
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Table 1: Cigarette price dispersion, TUS-CPS 
  2003 2006/2007 














Purchasers of packs  64.31% 
(20349)  $3.49 0.28  67.05% 
(18734)  $3.96 0.31 
Purchasers of cartons in home state  31.72% 
(10037)  $2.51 0.33  29.40% 
(8215)  $2.86 0.35 
Purchasers of cartons in border state  3.44% 
(1087)  $2.20 0.34  3.13% 
(875)  $2.59 0.38 
Purchasers by some other means  0.53% 
(167)  $2.08 0.59  0.41% 
(115)  $2.37 0.68 
Full sample  100% 
(31640)  $3.13 0.33 100% 












Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable   Mean 
  Cigarette price ($ per pack)  3.352 
  Cigarette tax in purchase state ($ per pack)  0.779 
  Female   0.521 
  Age 15-24  0.112 
  Age 25-34  0.198 
  Age 35-44  0.233 
  Age 45-54  0.233 
  Age 55-64  0.141 
  Age 65 or more (omitted category)  0.082 
  Non-Hispanic white (omitted category)  0.799 
  Non-Hispanic black  0.083 
  Hispanic  0.063 
  Other races  0.055 
  Less than high school  0.180 
  High school (omitted category)   0.404 
  Some college  0.296 
  College or higher  0.120 
  Family income < 20k (omitted category)  0.247 
  Family income 20k-35k  0.216 
  Family income 35k-60k  0.235 
  Family income 60k+  0.216 
  Family income missing  0.086 
  Married (omitted category)  0.445 
  Divorced, widowed, or separated   0.293 
  Never married  0.262 
  Household size  2.650 
  Number of smokers in the household  1.392 
  Year 2003 (omitted category)   0.531 
  Year 2006  0.298 
  Year 2007  0.172 
  Non-MSA (omitted category)   0.351 
  MSA population < 0.5 million  0.189 
  MSA population 0.5-2.5 million  0.286 
  MSA population > 2.5 million  0.173 
  Northeast (omitted category)    0.185 
  Midwest   0.280 
  South   0.319 
  West   0.216 
  Minimum cigarette price law  0.484 
  Number of tobacco outlets per thousand people  0.824 
Source: Data on state minimum cigarette price law are from Michael (2000). Data on tobacco outlets 
are from Economic Census 2002. 
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Cigarette tax  1.016***  0.972***  0.785***  0.257*** 
   (0.064)  (0.074)  (0.089)  (0.095) 
Female -0.015*  0.008  0.022*  0.095*** 
   (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.031) 
Age 15-24  0.568***  0.305***  0.167***  0.262* 
   (0.035)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.136) 
Age 25-34  0.473***  0.286***  0.079***  0.238*** 
   (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.085) 
Age 35-44  0.320***  0.200***  0.035  0.178** 
   (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.023)  (0.070) 
Age 45-54  0.180***  0.101***  -0.008  0.080 
   (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.079) 
Age 55-64  0.064***  0.055*  -0.035  -0.076 
   (0.022)  (0.029)  (0.025)  (0.050) 
Black 0.326***  0.139***  0.075  0.376*** 
   (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.048)  (0.066) 
Hispanic   0.305***  0.176***  -0.108  -0.130 
   (0.065)  (0.058)  (0.083)  (0.217) 
Other races  0.110  0.125  -0.052  -0.071 
   (0.072)  (0.078)  (0.048)  (0.086) 
Less than high school  -0.028*** -0.019  -0.068***  -0.099 
   (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.067) 
Some college  0.037***  0.031**  0.023  0.022 
   (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.056) 
College or higher  0.187***  0.174***  0.125***  0.168** 
   (0.022)  (0.028)  (0.018)  (0.063) 
Family income 20k-35k  0.079***  0.083***  0.174***  0.126** 
   (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.055) 
Family income 35k-60k  0.147***  0.158***  0.264***  0.227*** 
   (0.014)  (0.020)  (0.027)  (0.057) 
Family income 60k+  0.244***  0.213***  0.445***  0.361*** 
   (0.016)  (0.026)  (0.035)  (0.076) 
Family income missing  0.131***  0.151***  0.193***  0.130 
   (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.028)  (0.089) 
Divorced, widowed, separated  0.039***  0.012  0.009  0.003 
   (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.046)  
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Never married  0.112***  0.085***  0.014  -0.002 
   (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.078) 
Household size  -0.000  -0.010***  -0.034***  -0.051** 
   (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.019) 
Number of smokers in household -0.086*** -0.033***  -0.037**  -0.015 
   (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.044) 
Year 2006  0.177***  0.181***  0.154***  0.269*** 
   (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.043) 
Year 2007  0.267***  0.290***  0.177***  0.452*** 
   (0.026)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.083) 
MSA pop < 0.5 million  0.030  0.013  0.039  0.034 
   (0.033)  (0.037)  (0.034)  (0.074) 
MSA pop 0.5-2.5 million  0.067  0.055  0.046  -0.043 
   (0.040)  (0.051)  (0.041)  (0.083) 
MSA pop > 2.5 million  0.344***  0.338***  0.229**  0.252** 
   (0.115)  (0.111)  (0.095)  (0.102) 
Midwest   -0.236*** -0.348**  0.049  -0.199* 
   (0.082)  (0.143)  (0.161)  (0.099) 
South   -0.318*** -0.402**  -0.095  -0.324*** 
   (0.093)  (0.152)  (0.158)  (0.102) 
West   -0.104  -0.160  0.105  -0.159 
   (0.103)  (0.161)  (0.202)  (0.159) 
Minimum price law  -0.025  -0.066  -0.007  -0.125* 
   (0.039)  (0.050)  (0.044)  (0.073) 
Number of outlets per 1000 people  0.037  -0.059  0.200  0.119 
   (0.131)  (0.162)  (0.213)  (0.230) 
Constant 2.159***  2.717***  1.731***  1.987*** 
   (0.180)  (0.278)  (0.331)  (0.221) 
Observations 59115  39006  18221  1888 
R-squared 0.397  0.413  0.298  0.177 
Robust standard errors (clustered at state level) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4: Estimated Tax Pass-through Rates, by Smoking Behaviors 
 Cigarette  tax  N 
Frequency of cigarettes smoked     
- Non daily  1.015 9876 
- Daily light (<10)  1.018 6670 
- Daily moderate (10-30)  1.013 39347 
- Daily heavy (>30)  0.922 3017 
Quitting behavior and intents    
-  smokers who attempted to quit and 
have a plan to quit  1.043 13745 
- smokers who attempted to quit but no 
future plan to quit  1.016 6471 
- smokers with a future plan but who had 
not attempted to quit in past year  1.027 11599 
- smokers who did not attempt to quit in 
the past and who do not plan to quit in 
the future 
0.988 27300 
How soon to smoke 1
st cigarette 
after wake up     
- < 30 minutes  1.001 22213 
- 30-60 minutes  1.007 20774 
- >60 minutes  1.033 16128 
Type of cigarettes 1    
- Light/mild  1.152 17313 
- Regular/full flavor  1.039 13315 
Type of cigarettes 2    
- Menthol  0.974 15014 
- Non menthol  1.029 38561 
Note: The information on light cigarettes is only available in 2003.  
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Appendix Table: Average and Coefficient of Variation of Cigarette Prices, by 
State 
  2003 2006/2007 
State Mean  CV  TBOT 
price  Mean CV TBOT 
price 
AL  2.66 0.24  3.23  3.11 0.34  3.54 
AK 4.08 0.26  4.42  5.38 0.25  5.82 
AZ  3.61 0.26  4.03  4.22 0.30  4.35 
AR 2.69 0.28  3.60  3.07 0.31  3.71 
CA 3.62 0.26  3.95  3.95 0.29  3.95 
CO 2.67 0.24  3.21  3.45 0.26  4.03 
CT  4.19 0.22  4.68  4.52 0.24  4.67 
DE  2.66 0.25  3.53  3.09 0.31  3.56 
DC 3.58 0.27  4.10  4.15 0.26  4.24 
FL  2.74 0.28  3.31  2.92 0.34  3.44 
GA 2.62 0.24  3.31  2.95 0.30  3.50 
HI  3.84 0.24  4.72  4.35 0.25  5.27 
ID  2.73 0.30  3.65  3.21 0.29  3.65 
IL  3.53 0.25  4.06  4.00 0.36  4.82 
IN  2.82 0.24  3.51  3.17 0.31  3.49 
IA  2.64 0.25  3.33  2.87 0.29  3.36 
KS  2.98 0.31  3.87  3.27 0.38  3.99 
KY 2.12 0.31  3.10  2.59 0.35  3.32 
LA  2.78 0.26  3.41  3.08 0.32  3.50 
ME 3.5 0.26 4.28 4.54  0.27 5.28 
MD 3.38 0.26  4.11  3.64 0.27  4.11 
MA 4.31 0.28  5.15  4.65 0.24  5.00 
MI  3.61 0.23  4.33  4.44 0.26  5.29 
MN  3  0.24 3.43 3.87  0.24 4.59 
MS 2.46 0.25  3.22  2.78 0.34  3.22 
MO 2.64 0.28  3.16  2.62 0.32  3.25 
MT 2.84 0.26  3.83  4.20 0.28  4.91 
NE  2.97 0.26  3.79  3.22 0.33  3.72 
NV 3.01 0.29  3.77  3.55 0.30  3.78 
NH 2.93 0.20  3.57  3.50 0.31  3.76 
NJ  4.36 0.24  5.47  5.46 0.22  5.99 
NM 2.88 0.32  3.79  3.45 0.38  3.82 
NY 4.29 0.43  5.54  4.59 0.35  5.44 
NC 2.36 0.28  3.11  2.88 0.40  3.29 
ND 2.72 0.30  3.53  2.96 0.31  3.37 
OH 2.93 0.25  3.59  3.63 0.25  4.19 
OK 2.37 0.32  3.23  3.19 0.34  4.04 
OR 3.49 0.23  4.24  3.69 0.28  4.21 
PA  3.36 0.23  3.91  3.98 0.25  4.30 
RI  4.08 0.21  4.80  5.14 0.20  5.71 
SC  2.42 0.25  3.17  2.60 0.40  3.09  
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SD  2.87 0.23  3.48  3.36 0.32  3.50 
TN  2.48 0.29  3.18  2.63 0.34  3.24 
TX  2.96 0.26  3.49  3.36 0.33  3.33 
UT  3.31 0.30  3.70  3.61 0.24  3.72 
VT  3.59 0.30  4.35  4.28 0.30  4.85 
VA 2.47 0.30  3.22  2.98 0.30  3.50 
WA 3.76 0.32  4.66  4.52 0.31  5.40 
WV 2.43 0.29  3.46  2.79 0.29  3.48 
WI  3.25 0.21  3.81  3.37 0.27  3.87 
WY 2.66 0.25  3.56  3.26 0.29  3.72 
Sources:  Authors calculations from the Tobacco Use Supplements to the Current 
Population Survey, 2003 and 2006-2007 cycles; and Orzechowski and Walker (2008). 
The Tax Burden on Tobacco 